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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
David Aaron Knutsen appeals from his convictions for sexual abuse of a 
vulnerable adult. On appeal, he asserts that the district court never acquired subject 
matter jurisdiction because the Grand Jury issued an Indictment beyond the Grand 
Jury's term of appointment. Even if the district court had acquired subject matter 
jurisdiction, the charges should have been dismissed because the statute by which 
Mr. Knutsen was charged is unconstitutional. The statute in question makes it illegal for 
anyone who is "vulnerable" to engage in any sexual contact regardless of their consent 
to the contact. The statute, on its face and as applied, is overbroad, vague, violates 
substantive due process, and violates equal protection. Alternatively, Mr. Knutsen 
asserts the court erred in instructing the jurors that consent was not a defense to the 
crime charged. In the further alternative, Mr. Knutsen contends that even if this Court 
were to find that all his challenges fail, the State failed to present sufficient evidence to 
support a finding V.M. is a vulnerable adult incapable of consenting to sexual contact. 
Finally, Mr. Knutsen asserts that his rights against double punishment were violated 
because the allegations of sexual contact involve one continuing single incident, not 
four separate criminal acts. 
Because the issues presented in this appeal regarding the constitutionality of the 
sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult statute are issues of first impression, Mr. Knutsen 
respectfully requests that the Idaho Supreme Court retain his appeal. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Knutsen was admitted into Canyon View Hospital after an emergency room 
visit. (Tr., p.571, Ls.9-10.) He suffers from both substance abuse and mental illness 
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and, therefore, has a dual diagnosis. (Tr., p.572, Ls.15-16.) While admitted at the 
hospital, Mr. Knutsen met a twenty-three year old female, V.M., who was likewise 
suffering from a psychological episode, in that she was suicidal. (Tr., p.406, Ls.20-25, 
p.574, Ls.9-13.) 
V.M. became very depressed after an unsuccessful attempt at attending college 
at the College of Southern Idaho. (Tr., p.404, Ls.3-17, p.467, Ls.18-21.) Her 
preexisting depression may have contributed to her college failure in that she stopped 
attending classes regularly. (Tr., p.466, L.20-p.467, L.2.) She also had broken her 
ankle requiring her to utilize a walker to maneuver about. (Tr., p.407, Ls.20-23.) 
According to V.M., no one thought she would be successful in college, and when their 
predictions came true, she felt like an ultimate failure, slipping deeper into depression. 
(Tr., p.479, Ls.15-25.) V.M., however, was not in a vegetative depressive state. 
(Tr., p.539, Ls.13-20.) 
V.M. had successfully graduated Minico High School. (Tr., p.403, L.14-p.404, 
L.1.) Although V.M. attended special education classes for some of her course work 
such as English and speech, she also participated in regular classes such as history, 
cooking, business, and computers. (Tr., p.456, Ls.23-24, p.459, L.16-p.460, L.10.) She 
noted receiving Bs and Cs in the more difficult classes, recognizing that her grades 
were above average in some of the regular course work. (Tr., p.460, Ls.8-13.) V.M.'s 
overall full-scale intelligent quotient (IQ) is 72. (Tr., p.532, Ls.20-22.) However, her 
verbal comprehension index is an 81 with vocabulary being one of her many strengths. 
(Tr., p.535, Ls.24-25, p.537, Ls.19-22.) Like most normal functioning adults, V.M. really 
enjoys computers, Facebook, and the Internet. (Tr., p.461, Ls.3-16.) She admitted to 
being a good reader and enjoying reading in her spare time. (Tr., p.462, Ls.11-14.) Her 
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overall IQ places her in the borderline intellectual functioning range or the 
borderline/slow learner range. (Tr., p.533, Ls.1-2.) 
During her junior year, classmates elected V.M. to be on student counsel, and in 
her senior year, the entire school selected her to be on student counsel. (Tr., p.456, 
Ls.22-24, p.458, Ls.7-15.) While on student counsel, she was the director of student 
activities. (Tr., p.457, Ls.20-22.) She helped plan the school assemblies and the junior 
class prom. (Tr., p.458, Ls.20-24.) She recalls being up until two in the morning to 
finish decorating for the dance. (Tr., p.459, Ls.9-15.) 
V.M. enjoys hanging out with friends, talking on the phone, and watching 
television. (Tr., p.405, Ls.16-19.) She enjoys mature shows such as Law and Order, 
CSI, and Parenthood. (Tr., p.405, Ls.20-22.) According to Doctor Hoglund, given her 
intellectual capacity, if V.M. was educated about sexual interaction, she had the 
cognitive ability to understand. (Tr., p.554, Ls.9-12.) Moreover, the doctor thought with 
V.M.'s mental health issues, she would be capable of making decisions regarding her 
welfare. (Tr., p.552, Ls.17-21.) 
V.M.'s mother is her guardian; her mom helps her manage her finances, 
understand medical issues, and legal situations. (Tr., p.404, L.20-p.405, L.2.) After her 
release from the hospital, she began living at a facility that would help her with her 
limitations. (Tr., p.401, L.23-p.402, L.1.) V.M. has a PSR that helps her prepare to live 
in the community. (Tr., p.402, Ls.10-23.) The PSR teaches V.M. how to budget and 
communicate with others. (Tr., p.403, Ls.3-6.) 
As mentioned above, Mr. Knutsen and V.M. met while both were admitted into 
Canyon View Hospital. (Tr., p.406, Ls.20-25; p.574, Ls.9-13.) While in the television 
room, V.M. spotted Mr. Knutsen and thought he was looking at her. (Tr., p.412, Ls.15-
3 
21.) Later in the evening, after dinner, V.M. was in the cafeteria when Mr. Knutsen 
entered and sat near her. (Tr., p.420, Ls.2-9.) V.M. was not wearing a bra. (Tr., p.426, 
Ls.1-2.) Mr. Knutsen asked V.M. if he could touch her breasts and she told him he 
could. (Tr., p.427, Ls.17-21.) Mr. Knutsen also touched V.M.'s vagina with his foot. 
(Tr., p.430, Ls.13-20.) Mr. Knutsen then asked if he could see V.M.'s vagina and she 
told him he could. (Tr., p.430, Ls.13-15.) The two went behind a pop machine so that 
the staff would not see them. (Tr., p.430, Ls.16-19.) When Mr. Knutsen asked V.M. to 
pull down her pants, she did, and showed him her vagina. (Tr., p.434, Ls.14-18.) V.M. 
also touched Mr. Knutsen's penis. (Tr., p.447, Ls.14-17.) 
Mr. Knutsen was released from the hospital the following day in the late 
afternoon. (Tr., p.621, Ls.19-25.) He made further attempts to contact V.M. by calling 
her at the hospital. (Tr., p.624, Ls.9-21.) Staff instructed Mr. Knutsen not to call 
Canyon View again. (Tr., p.624, Ls.23-24.) Subsequently, staff reported the incident to 
the authorities a few days later. (Tr., p.580, Ls.15-24.) 
Almost ten months later, on November 13, 2008, the prosecuting attorney 
requested that a grand jury be impaneled. (R., p.52.) The following day, with the 
assistance of the district court and prosecutor a grand jury was selected, sworn, and 
impaneled. (R., pp.90, 149.) The order impaneling the jury provided, "once selected 
and convened, the grand jury shall serve a term of four months until discharged by this 
Court and during its term shall meet from time to time as necessary to conduct 
business." (R., p.208.) 
On March 25, 2009, a Grand Jury signed an Indictment charging Mr. Knutsen 
with four counts of sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult. (R., pp.12-14.) The Grand Jury 
accused Mr. Knutsen of touching V.M.'s genitals with his hand and foot, touching her 
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breast, and having her touch his genitals. (R., pp.12-14.) The true bill was signed on 
March 25, 2009. (R., pp.12-14.) 
Mr. Knutsen filed a motion to dismiss the Indictment on grounds that the Grand 
Jury acted without jurisdiction because it indicted him beyond the four-month period the 
court had impaneled them for. (R., pp.52-56.) The district court determined that 
Mr. Knutsen was properly indicted. (R., pp.207-240.) The district court found that the 
Grand Jury was selected and impaneled on November 14, 2008; however, it did not 
convene for the first time until December 3, 2008. (R., pp.210-211.) Therefore, at the 
time of the indictment on March 25, 2013, the Grand Jury was within its four-month term 
because the district court had set the time to begin when they were "selected and 
convened." (R., pp.210-211.) 
Mr. Knutsen also moved to have the statute by which he was charged declared 
unconstitutional as a violation of both due process and equal protection. (R., pp.57-62.) 
He asserted that the statute was unconstitutionally void for vagueness as applied, and 
on its face, and overbroad. (R., pp.57-62, 77-87.) Mr. Knutsen argued that the statute 
restricted adults from carrying out their constitutionally guaranteed right to engage in 
sexual activity. (R., pp.77-82.) He also asserted that the statute violated principles of 
due process because it failed to give ordinary people notice of what behavior is 
prohibited in order to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. (R., pp.82-86.) 
The district court found the statute constitutional. (R., pp.183-199.) It recognized 
that the law must inform it citizens of what is commanded or forbidden so that a person 
of ordinary intelligence need not guess about the law, and so that law enforcement has 
minimal guidelines to enforce such law. (R., pp.185-187.) The district court also noted 
that the overbreadth doctrine concerns statutes that regulate constitutionally protected 
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freedoms and that the laws must have narrow limitations. (R., p.187.) The district court 
found that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. (R., p.188.) The 
court found that the law gave Mr. Knutsen fair notice of the prohibited conduct and that 
it may be constitutionally applied to his conduct. (R., p.188.) The court felt that the 
citizens are on fair notice that criminal liability may be imposed for having sexual contact 
with a vulnerable adult. (R., p.190.) Moreover, it held that it was the legislature's 
prerogative to enact a strict liability crime. (R., pp.190-195.) Finally, the district court 
determined that there is no constitutionally protected right to have sexual relations with 
a person who is incapable of providing consent. (R., pp.196-198.) 
The jury convicted Mr. Knutsen on all four counts. (R., pp.403-405.) The district 
court imposed upon Mr. Knutsen four concurrent unified sentences of twenty-five years, 
with seven years fixed, on each count of sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult. 
(R., pp.487-493.) Mr. Knutsen timely appealed the Judgment of Conviction. 
(R., pp.494-496.) 
6 
ISSUES 
1) Did the court lack subject matter jurisdiction because the Grand Jury's term 
expired rendering the indictment issued void? 
2) Is Idaho's sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult statute unconstitutional because it 
is overbroad? 
3) Does the application of Idaho's sexual contact with a vulnerable adult statute to 
private, consensual sexual relations between consenting adults violate 
Mr. Knutsen's right to due process of law and equal protection? 
4) Is Idaho's sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult statute unconstitutionally void for 
vagueness in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution? 
5) Did the district court err when it instructed the jury that V.M.'s consent to sexual 
contact was not a defense to the crime of sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult? 
6) Should this Court vacate Mr. Knutsen's convictions for sexual abuse of a 
vulnerable adult because there was insufficient evidence to support the 
convictions? 
7) Should this Court vacate three of the convictions of sexual abuse of a vulnerable 
adult because Mr. Knutsen's protection against double punishment under the 
double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Idaho Constitutions was 
violated, because he was charged and convicted of four counts of sexual abuse 
of a vulnerable adult where his actions amounted to one continuous act, without 
a break in the chain of events, such that he should only be punished for one 
offense? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Court Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction Because The Grand Jury's Term Expired 
Rendering The Indictment Issued Void 
A Introduction 
Mr. Knutsen contends a valid Indictment was never entered against him and, 
therefore, the district court never had subject matter jurisdiction over his case under 
Article I, section 8 of the Idaho Constitution. He asserts that the district court erred 
when it denied his motion to dismiss the invalid indictment. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The question of whether the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction is a 
question of law that this Court reviews de nova. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 
755, 757 (2004). Whether an information or indictment conforms to legal requirements 
is also a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Id. 
C. An Indictment Returned By A Grand Jury Whose Term Expired Is Void 
Pursuant to Article I, section 8 of the Idaho Constitution, "[n]o person shall be 
held to answer for any felony or criminal offense of any grade, unless on presentment or 
indictment of a grand jury or on information of the public prosecutor .... " "A grand jury 
is a body of men or women or both, sixteen (16) in number, returned in pursuance of 
law from citizens of the county before a court of competent jurisdiction and sworn to 
inquire of public offenses committed or triable within the county." I.C. § 2-103. The 
Idaho Constitution further provides that the district court may summon the grand jury in 
the manner provided by law. IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 8. Idaho law provides that "[a] 
grand jury shall serve until discharged by the court but no grand jury shall serve more 
than six (6) months unless specifically ordered by the court which summoned the grand 
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jury." I.C.R. 6.8. Thus, pursuant to the court's inherent powers, a grand jury is only 
valid for the period the district court has authorized it to be valid. See id. 
Once properly impaneled the grand jury is responsible for determining whether 
the district court shall receive subject matter jurisdiction over the criminal matter in 
controversy. State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 228 (2004). The indictment is the 
jurisdictional instrument upon which a defendant stands trial. Id. If a grand jury enters 
an indictment beyond its term, the indictment is invalid and the court has no subject 
matter jurisdiction over the case. State v. Dailing, 128 Idaho 203, 206 (1996); State v. 
Lute, 150 Idaho 837,841 (2011). 
In Dailing, it was undisputed the grand jury returned an Indictment after its term 
had expired. Dailing, 128 Idaho at 204-05. "The grand jurors in [Dalling's] case were 
convened on October 13, 1992 and were vested with the authority to review cases and 
return indictments." Id. at 205. By court rule, the grand jury lost "its legal status as a 
body empowered to act as a grand jury" six months later. Id. Dalling's case was not 
under investigation or presentation of any evidence to the grand jury prior to the six-
month expiration date. In fact, the grand jury heard about Dalling's case for the first 
time three weeks after its term had expired. Id. Therefore, because the grand jury had 
no authority to meet and return indictments, the district court never acquired subject 
matter jurisdiction over Dalling's criminal case. Id. at 205-06. 
State v. Lute rendered the same result - vacation of the judgment of conviction 
because the district court never acquired subject matter jurisdiction over the matter 
because the same grand jury as Dalling's case issued an Indictment in Lute's case. 
Lute, 150 Idaho at 841. The State attempted to avoid the same outcome as Dailing 
arguing that because Lute waited many years to raise the claim via an I.C.R. 35 motion, 
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his claim was moot. Id. at 839-40. The Lute Court also rejected the State's argument 
that Lute's claim involved a "defective" indictment. Id. Instead, the Lute Court 
recognized that the error committed was that there was no indictment under the law; 
"the citizens that issued the purported indictment was not a grand jury." Id. at 841. The 
result was that there was no grand jury process at all. Id. 
In this case, the prosecuting attorney signed a Petition for Summoning A Grand 
Jury on November 12, 2008, and filed the same document with the court the following 
day. (See Petition For Summoning A Grand Jury. 1) The following day the Honorable G. 
Richard Bevan signed an Order Summoning And Convening A Grand Jury. (See Order 
Summoning And Convening A Grand Jury.) The Order "summoned and convened" a 
Grand Jury to appear on the 14th day of November 2008, to commence inquiry into the 
matter of public offense. (See Order Summoning And Convening A Grand Jury.) 
Moreover, the order limited the period of the Grand Jury to four months. (See Order 
Summoning And Convening A Grand Jury.) The Order specifically provided, "IT IS 
FURTHER ORDERED that once selected and convened, the grand jury shall serve a 
term of four months until discharged by the Court, and during its term shall meet from 
time to time as necessary to conduct its business[.]" (See Order Summoning And 
Convening A Grand Jury.) 
As authorized by the district court, on November 14, 2008, at 9:06 a.m. a hearing 
was held to impanel a Grand Jury for Twin Falls. (Tr.11/14/2008, p.1, L.1-p.6, L.3, p.7, 
Ls.10-11.) The court instructed that those chosen would be responsible to return 
Indictments against individuals whom they found probable cause to exist. 
1 A Motion To Augment Has been filed contemporaneously with this brief, asking this 
Court to augment the appellant record with the following documents: Petition for 
Summoning A Grand Jury; and Order Summoning And Convening A Grand Jury. 
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(Tr.11/14/2008, p.9, Ls.5-7.) The court also instructed this potential Grand Jury that its 
term was "set for approximately four months" noting that they would typically meet every 
other Wednesday. (Tr.11/14/2008, p.10, Ls.5-10.) The court informed the potential 
grand jurors that they would not be hearing cases that day. (Tr.11/14/2008, p.6, Ls.3-
5.) The court also noted the dates that the Grand Jury would be scheduled to meet, 
including one date that went beyond four months from the date of the impaneling. 
(Tr.11/14/2008, p.10, Ls.15-17.) 
Not only did the court instruct the potential Grand Jury about dates and meeting 
times, the prosecutor did also. (Tr., p.17, Ls.22-24.) The prosecutor again informed the 
Grand Jury that their appointment would last approximately four months. 
(Tr.11/14/2008, p.17, Ls.22-24.) Additionally, the prosecutor stated, 
I cannot promise you how many times you will need to meet during the 
next four months. It's all dependent upon potential crimes committed in 
Twin Falls County for that period of time, of which none of us has any way 
of having a crystal ball or guessing on that. But typically, a grand jury may 
meet four to five times in four months, again, from 9:00 a.m. till generally 
the noon hour, sometimes a bit beyond. Once in a while, grand juries 
meet up to six, seven times in a four-month period. Sometimes they don't 
meet at all or once, twice. We just have no way of knowing. 
(Tr.11/14/2008, p.17, L.24-p.18, L.11.) 
After removing a number of potential Grand Jury members, the district court 
swore in the sixteen members that were selected to act as the Grand Jury. 
(Tr.11/14/2008, p.130, Ls.7-10.) After the members took their oath, they were 
impaneled as the next Grand Jury. (Tr.11/14/2008, p.132, Ls.11-12.) The presiding 
grand juror and deputy presiding grand jury were selected and sworn. (Tr.11/14/2008, 
p.134, L.19-p.135, L.8.) The grand jurors were given authority to consider cases that 
they had knowledge of or which came before their attention, not necessarily by the 
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prosecuting attorney. (Tr.11/14/2008, p.136, Ls.15-23.) After full instructions and oaths 
given, the Grand Jury went into recess. (Tr.11/14/2008, p.157, Ls.7-8.) 
The Grand Jury was impaneled and convened on November 14, 2008. The 
district court issued an order granting them authority to act for the next four months. 
Their term expired four months later on March 14, 2009. From November 14, 2008 until 
March 14, 2009, the Grand Jury stood ready to act at the prosecutor's discretion or on 
its own initiative to investigate any criminal offenses and issue indictments. There were 
no orders extending the time for the Grand Jury to meet and hear cases. 
The district court denied Mr. Knutsen's motion because it felt that the Grand Jury 
did not convene until December 3, 2008. (R., p.211.) However, this finding is contrary 
to the district court's November 13, 2008 order when the Grand Jury actually was 
ordered to be convened, was subsequently impaneled, and granted authority to 
investigate cases. The November 13, 2008 court order authorized the impaneled Grand 
Jury to act for four months, ending its authority to investigate crimes on March 14, 2009. 
When the citizens heard the facts involving Mr. Knutsen's case on March 25, 
2009, they acted without authority and were not a Grand Jury as their term that was set 
out by the district court had expired. See Lute, 150 Idaho at 841. As a valid Indictment 
was never entered against Mr. Knutsen, the district court never had subject matter 
jurisdiction over Mr. Knutsen's case under Article I, section 8 of the Idaho Constitution. 
See Lute, 150 Idaho at 841. Therefore, Mr. Knutsen request that his conviction be 
vacated and the case dismissed against him. 
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11. 
Idaho's Sexual Abuse Of A Vulnerable Adult Statute Is Unconstitutional Because It Is 
Overbroad 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Knutsen asserts that the sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult statute is 
overbroad because it infringes on the constitutionally protected privacy and freedom of 
association rights of consenting adults to engage in sexual contact. Mr. Knutsen 
asserts that Idaho has adopted a law that describes who may not consent, instead of 
limiting or defining what consent means. Because the law adopted by Idaho takes away 
individual fundamental rights to engage in sexual contact without any establishment of 
consent, it is overbroad and should be held unconstitutional. 
8. Standard Of Review 
A party challenging the constitutionality of a statute must overcome a strong 
presumption of validity. State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197 ( 1998). However, the 
constitutionality of a statute is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. State v. Hart, 
135 Idaho 827, 829 (2001). 
C. Mr. Knutsen Has Standing To Assert An Overbreadth Challenge 
Mr. Knutsen asserts that he has standing to assert the overbreadth challenge to 
the sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult statute because he contends that he and V.M. 
engaged in consensual behavior. The court specifically instructed the jury that consent 
was not a defense to the crime of sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult. (R., p.393.) 
Thus, Mr. Knutsen is asserting his own rights to engage in sexual contact with a 
consenting adult. See State v. Holden, 126 Idaho 755 (1995); Anderson v. Morrow, 371 
F.3d 1027, 1040 (9th Cir. 2004) (Berzon, CJ. Concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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D. Idaho's Sexual Abuse Of A Vulnerable Adult Statute Is Unconstitutional Because 
It Is Overbroad 
The district court found the statute not to be overbroad or violating the 
constitutional right to engage in sexual activity. (R., p.188.) In its analysis, the court 
noted that sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult was a general intent crime; both consent 
of the alleged victim and knowledge of the victim's status were irrelevant in determining 
guilt. (R., pp.191-196.) In its specific overbroad analysis, the district court determined 
that no constitutional right exists because a vulnerable adult is incapable of providing 
consent. (R., pp.196-197.) Therefore, Mr. Knutsen failed to demonstrate the first prong 
of the overbroad analysis because the statute did not proscribe constitutionally 
protected conduct. (R., p.198.) Mr. Knutsen asserts the district court erred and that this 
Court should find the statute unconstitutional because it is overbroad. 
The Idaho Supreme Court recently articulated the proper analysis of the 
overbreath doctrine. 
"The overbreadth doctrine is aimed at statutes which, though designed to 
prohibit legitimately regulated conduct, include within their prohibitions 
constitutionally protected freedoms." Korsen, 138 Idaho at 713, 69 P.3d at 
133. The two-part test for unconstitutional overbreadth asks (1) whether 
the statute regulates constitutionally protected conduct, and (2) whether 
the statute precludes a significant amount of that constitutionally protected 
conduct. Id. If the answer to both steps is in the affirmative, then the 
statute is overbroad. See id. "A statute that is found to be overbroad may 
not be enforced at all, even against speech or conduct that could 
constitutionally be prohibited by a more narrowly drawn statute." Id. at 
714, 69 P.3d at 134. "Only if the statute intrudes upon a substantial 
amount of constitutionally protected conduct may it be struck down for 
overbreadth." Id. (emphasis added) (quotation omitted). 
State v. Manzanares, 152 Idaho 410, 423-24 (2012). 
The statutory scheme under which Mr. Knutsen was convicted provides: 
It is a felony for any person, with the intent of arousing, appealing to or 
gratifying the lust, passion or sexual desires of such person, a vulnerable 
adult or a third party, to: ... [c]ause or have sexual contact with a 
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vulnerable adult, not amounting to lewd conduct as defined in paragraph 
(a) of this subsection. 
Idaho Code§ 18-1505B. Idaho Code§ 18-1505 defines vulnerable adult as: 
a person eighteen (18) years of age or older who is unable to protect 
himself from abuse, neglect or exploitation due to physical or mental 
impairment which affects the person's judgment or behavior to the extent 
that he lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate 
or implement decisions regarding his person, funds, property or resources. 
Mr. Knutsen asserts that the statutory scheme is overbroad in that it regulates 
constitutionally protected conduct, i.e., right to privacy and right to association, and the 
statute precludes a significant amount of that constitutionally protected conduct. 
Mr. Knutsen asserts that the statute is both overbroad on its face and as applied. 
1. Idaho Code 18-15058 Regulates Constitutionally Protected Conduct, The 
Right To Privacy 
This Court begins an examination of whether a statute or order is facially 
overbroad with first determining whether the statute regulates constitutionally protected 
conduct. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,614 (1973); State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 
706, 714 (2003). The federal constitutional right to privacy is derived from the liberty 
interest protected by the due process clause. As stated by the United States Supreme 
Court, 
Although "(t)he Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of 
privacy," the Court has recognized that one aspect of the "liberty" 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is "a 
right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of 
privacy." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152, 93 S.Ct. 705, 726, 35 L.Ed.2d 
147 (1973). This right of personal privacy includes "the interest in 
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions." Whalen v. 
Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600, 97 S.Ct. 869, 876, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977). 
While the outer limits of this aspect of privacy have not been marked by 
the Court, it is clear that among the decisions that an individual may make 
without unjustified government interference are personal decisions 
"relating to marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 
1823, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967); procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. 
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541-542, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 1113-1114, 86 L.Ed. 
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1655 (1942); contraception, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S., at 453-454, 92 
S.Ct. at 1038-1039; id., at 460, 463-465, 92 S.Ct. at 1042, 1043-1044 
(White, J., concurring in result); family relationships, Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 64 S.Ct. 438, 442, 88 L.Ed. 645 
(1944); and child rearing and education, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 
U.S. 510, 535, 45 S.Ct. 571, 573, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925); Meyer v. 
Nebraska, (262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923))." Roe 
v. Wade, supra, at 152-153, 93 S.Ct., at 726. See also Cleveland Board of 
Education v. LaF/eur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-640, 94 S.Ct. 791, 796-797, 39 
L.Ed.2d 52 (1974). 
Carey v. Population Servs., Int'/, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977); see also State v. Holden, 
126 Idaho 775, 760 (Ct. App. 1995). The State constitutional right to privacy is found in 
Art. 1, § 1 (declaring right to enjoy and defend "life and liberty") and Art. 1, § 21 (stating 
the enumeration of rights in the constitution "shall not be construed to impair or deny 
other rights retained by the people"). See Murphy v. Pocatello School District, 94 Idaho 
32, 38 (1971) (holding that wearing hair in a certain manner is protected right of 
personal taste not to be interfered with by the government without substantial 
justification). 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a substantive due process 
right to engage in private, consensual sexual conduct exists. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 578 (2003); State v. Cook, 146 Idaho 261, 262 (Ct. App. 2008). In Lawrence, the 
Court invalidated a Texas statute "making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to 
engage in certain intimate sexual conduct." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. The statute 
outlawed "deviate sexual intercourse" between members of the same sex, specifically 
oral and anal sex. Id. at 563. The Court resolved the issue by determining whether the 
defendants "were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their 
liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution." Id. at 564. The Court acknowledged that "[t]here are broad statements of 
the substantive reach of liberty under the Due Process Clause" in previous cases. Id. 
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(citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 
390 (1923); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)). 
While Griswold is the most well-known example of the Court declaring a right to 
privacy encompassed in the Due Process Clause, the Lawrence Court recognized that, 
"[a]fter Griswold, it was established that the right to make certain decisions regarding 
sexual conduct extends beyond the marital relationship." Id. at 565. Thus, in 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court invalidated a law prohibiting the distribution of 
contraceptives to unmarried persons. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438, 453-454 (1972). The 
Eisenstadt Court stated: 
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the 
marital relationship. . . . If the right to privacy means anything, it is the 
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into matters to fundamentally affecting a person as 
the decision whether or bear or beget a child. 
Id. at 453. As the Lawrence Court observed, "the reasoning of Griswold could not be 
confined to the protection of rights of married adults." Lawrence, 558 U.S. at 566. 
Id. 
According to Lawrence: 
It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon this 
relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and 
still retain their dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds overt 
expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be 
but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty 
protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to 
make this choice. 
The Lawrence Court did recognize that the facts of the case did not involve a 
minor and did involve two adults, who "with full and mutual consent from each other" 
engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. Id. at 578. Under 
17 
those circumstances, consenting adults have a liberty right under the Due Process 
Clause to engage in sexual contact without government intervention. Id. 
In a pre-Lawrence decision, the Idaho Court of Appeals evaluated whether Idaho 
Code § 18-919 violated the defendant's constitutional rights because the statute 
infringed on protected privacy rights of medical care providers to engage in consensual 
sexual contact. State v. McKeeth, 136 Idaho 619, 624-25 (Ct. App. 2001). Idaho 
Code § 18-919 criminalizes sexual contact between a therapist and patient regardless if 
actual consent for sexual contact exist. I.C. § 18-919.2 McKeeth sought to have the 
jury instructed on the State's requirement to prove the lack of consent. McKeeth, 136 
Idaho at 625. Relying on Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), which was 
subsequently overruled by Lawrence, the Court of Appeals determined that no 
fundamental right on the part of the professional counselor or the patient to engage in 
sexual conduct during the course of the professional relationship existed. Id. at 625. 
The McKeeth Court noted that the sexual contact that occurred in the case was not 
related to a romantic relationship; instead, occurred during treatment sessions. Id. 
Ironically, a few years prior to McKeeth and in another pre-Lawrence decision, 
the Idaho Court of Appeals called into question the holding in Bowers and rejected the 
idea that no privacy right between married couples existed. State v. Holden, 126 Idaho 
755, 760-61 (1995). The Holden Court analyzed Idaho's infamous crime against nature 
statute to determine if the statute infringed upon fundamental personal liberties and 
whether the State had a compelling interest. Id. at 761. The Holden Court concluded 
2 A key difference to this statute is knowledge of the person's vulnerable status as the 
client do to the nature of the patient receiving treatment from the provider. 
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that the statute impermissibly abridged the constitutional right to privacy and recognized 
the unconstitutionality of the statute as applied to married couples. Id. at 761-62. 
The right to privacy exists under both the Constitutions of the United States and 
Idaho. Included in the right of privacy, is the right to have sexual contact with a 
consenting adult, regardless of whether the couple is married. As mentioned above, the 
district court interpreted the statute to mean that consent was irrelevant (R., pp.191 
195) and instructed the jury that consent was not a factor for consideration in the 
determination of guilt (R., p.393). This statute affects one's privacy rights, the right of 
consenting adults to engage in sexual conduct. Therefore, the first prong of the 
overbreadth doctrine exists; the statute regulates constitutionally protected conduct. 
See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,614 (1973); Korsen, 138 Idaho at 714. 
2. Idaho Code § 18-1505B Regulates Constitutionally Protected Conduct, 
The Right Of Association 
Additionally, the right to communicate and the right of association with others are 
among the activities that are constitutionally protected conduct under the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, which is made applicable to the states 
through the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., U.S. v. 
Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 322 (1990) (First Amendment embraces the freedom to 
effectively communicate with others); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-23 
(1960); cf. Elk Grove Unified School Dist. V. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 17 (2004) 
(recognizing in dicta that a parent's right to communicate with his or her child is 
protected under the First Amendment). The First Amendment has been held to protect 
both "expressive association"-speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, 
and the exercise of religion-and "intimate association." See Roberts v. United States 
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984). The right to intimate association refers to the 
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freedom to "enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships." Roberts, 468 
U.S. at 617. "Overbreadth attacks have also been allowed where the Court thought 
rights of association were ensnared in statutes which, by their broad sweep, might result 
in burdening innocent associations." Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612. 
Individuals have the right to develop and maintain intimate associations. This 
statute interferes with the development and continuation of those intimate relationships, 
especially when one's status over time changes, such as when one becomes vulnerable 
due to age or injury, as will be further elaborated on in the next section. 
Therefore, the first prong of the overbreadth doctrine exists; the statute regulates 
constitutionally protected conduct. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 614 
(1973); Korsen, 138 Idaho at 714. 
3. Idaho Code 18-1505B Precludes A Significant Amount Of Constitutionally 
Protected Conduct 
The district court never addressed whether Idaho Code § 18-1505B precludes a 
significant amount of constitutionally protected conduct because it found that no 
constitutional right existed. (R., pp.196-198.) In an attempt to justify the law, the State 
argued that the obvious purpose of protecting physically and mentally impaired citizens 
from nonconsensual sex was a sufficient legitimate interest and consistent with Idaho's 
disfavor of consensual unmarried sexual contact, as evidenced by the laws prohibiting 
unmarried individuals from having sex (I.C. § 18-6603) and prohibiting consensual 
sexual relationships between a married individual and another person (I.C. § 18-6601). 
(R., pp.130-131.) The State concluded that the statute's legitimate state interest did not 
infringe on any protected interest of another or violate substantive due process.3 
Mr. Knutsen asserts that the State is incorrect and Idaho Code § 18-15058 does 
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preclude a significant amount of constitutionally protected conduct, especially in the 
area of people with mental limitations and the elderly. 
"[O]verbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged 
in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 614. 
"[Lawrence] does not affect a state's legitimate interest and indeed, duty, to interpose 
when consent is in doubt." Anderson v. Morrow, 371 F.3d 1027, 1032-1033 (9th Cir. 
2004). "[H]owever permissible, even commendable, the goals of [I.C. § 18-1505B] may 
be, its . . . prohibitions are too broad in their sweep, failing to distinguish between 
conduct that may be proscribed and conduct that must be permitted." See Broadrick, 
413 U.S. at 607. "A statute that is found to be overbroad may not be enforced at all, 
even against speech or conduct that could constitutionally be prohibited by a more 
narrowly drawn statute." Korsen, 138 Idaho at 714. 
This statute in question does not regulate the meaning of consent or question 
consent; it takes an entire class of individuals and deems them incapable of consenting. 
The jury in this case was instructed that, "it is not a defense to the crime of Sexual 
Abuse of a Vulnerable Adult that V.M. may have consented to the alleged conduct." 
(R., p.393.) 
All jurisdictions have historical standards for determining whether a person with 
diminished capacity has consented to sexual intercourse. See Sexuality, Rape, and 
Mental Retardation, 1997 U. ILL. L. Rev. 315, 340 (1997). In each jurisdiction, the law 
does require a heightened determination of whether a person with a challenged mental 
capacity consented to sexual contact; however, no jurisdiction outright prohibits sexual 
contact, except the law in question in this appeal. Id. at 344-46. Six different tests have 
3 The substantive due process violation will be discussed further in Issue Ill. 
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been developed around the country to determine whether a person with questionable 
mental functioning has the capacity to consent to sexual contact. Id. at 344. The six 
tests are morality, totality of the circumstances, nature of the consequences, judgment, 
evidence of mental disability, and nature of the conduct. Id. 
The moral test, utilized in Idaho, requires an understanding of the nature and 
consequences of the act, including an evaluation of the victim's mental capacity for 
moral reasoning. Id. at 344-45; see a/so Anderson v. Morrow, 371 F.3d 1027, 1045 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (Berzon, CJ. Concurring in part and dissenting in part); State v. Soura, 118 
Idaho 232 (1990). Idaho has historically evaluated consent before concluding that a 
person of unsound mind due to mental illness, mental disability, or developmental 
disability is incapable of consenting to sexual intercourse. See State v. Soura, 118 
Idaho 232 (1990); see also State v. Cosier, 39 Idaho 519 (1924); State v. Simes, 12 
Idaho 310 (1906). 
Instead of utilizing Idaho's moral test for determining whether a vulnerable adult 
consented to sexual contact, Idaho decided to declare the entire group of individuals 
incapable of consenting to sexual contact. As enacted, the statute criminalizes a 
significant amount of constitutionally protected conduct, as revealed in the few 
examples below. 
First, there is no exemption for married couples, although that may have been 
the legislature's intent. The minutes of the Senate Judiciary and Rules Committee on 
February 28, 2005, reflect that Senator Davis had concerns about consenting adults in 
the martial setting and the application of this law. See 
http://legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2005/standingcommittees/sjudmin.pdf. It is 
apparent from the minutes, that the legislatures knew they were enacting an 
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unconstitutional law because the answer given recognized that because of the federal 
and state constitutions, the law should not apply to married people. Id. However, no 
exemptions were written into the law. Moreover, if the distinction is between non-
married and married individuals the law violates equal protection in that it treats 
consenting adults who are married different from consenting adults who are not 
married.4 There is nothing written in this statute that prohibits a prosecutor from 
charging an elderly husband from having sexual contact with his elderly wife who, for 
reasons of old age, is at times a vulnerable adult. 
Assume, a similar scenario where an elderly couple for reasons of financial 
independence (maybe one of them received alimony conditioned on not remarrying, 
disability complications, inheritance issues, etc ... ) decided never to marry. They have 
been monogamous for many years. One day, the female was involved in a serious car 
accident resulting in a closed head injury that left her unable to manage her finances, by 
definition she becomes a vulnerable adult. She is able to live independently and 
maintain her regular daily routines although she needs some assistance and is involved 
in rehabilitation. She is intimate with her longtime boyfriend, has consensual sexual 
contact. The law would allow the State to criminally prosecute her boyfriend. 
Assume, a young man is involved in a serious accident breaking his pelvis, leg, 
and hip. He is in a cast and resides at a rehabilitation hospital for several months, 
learning how to walk again. He meets a similar aged woman who is also in the facility; 
however, she is learning to speak, after suffering a stroke from a blood clot. They are 
both vulnerable, one by physical condition the other a possible mental defect. The two 
have consensual sexual contact. Should the State be allowed to prosecute either for 
4 The Equal Protection violation will be addressed further in Issue Ill. 
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their consensual acts? No, it interferes with ordinary citizens' rights to develop and 
maintain intimate associations with consenting adults and their right to privacy. 
While this case does not involve a mentally retarded individual, several articles 
suggest that someone with such classification should be allowed to have consensual 
sexual contact. See Sexuality, Rape, and Mental Retardation, 1997 U. ILL. L. Rev. 315, 
(1997); Criminal Law and the Capacity of Mentally Retarded Persons to Consent to 
Sexual Activity, 83 VA L. Rev. 799 (1997); Discrimination, Sexuality and People with 
Significant Disabilities: Issues of Access and the Right to Sexual Expression in the 
United States, Disability Studies Quarterly, Fall 2002, Volume 22, No.4. As noted 
above, Idaho utilizes a specialized "consent" test in the rape arena that would eliminate 
many of the complaints present in this appeal. Nevertheless, at issue in this case is 
Idaho's decision to enact a law that would essentially eliminate all sexual rights from 
mentally retarded individuals. Individuals with IQs between 55 and 69 are considered 
mildly mentally retarded. Criminal Law and the Capacity of Mentally Retarded Persons 
to Consent to Sexual Activity, 83 VA L. Rev. 799, 801-02 (1997). This category of 
individual develops social and communication skills in preschool years and typically 
acquires a sixth grade education. Id. at 802. With supervision, this category also 
seems to have vocation skills and live in the community with proper supervision. Id. 
Individuals in this category are higher functioning and appear to be more likely to 
consent to sexual contact. Id. That is not to say that Idaho should not be concerned 
that this category of individuals are actually giving intelligent consent to sexual contact 
and that they are not taken advantage of by those caring for them. However, the law 
that was enacted in 2005, just went too far and substantially interfered with Idaho 
citizen's fundamental right to privacy and freedom of association. 
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All Idahoans age and, as a result, we all will suffer some weakening mental and 
physical capacity over time. Assuming, that we as Idaho citizens live beyond the age of 
retirement, the likelihood of becoming vulnerable in some form or another is high. Idaho 
has not identified any compelling interest to take away consenting adults' rights to 
engage in sexual contact. While it may be necessary to ensure that someone that is in 
a coma or so severely mentally handicapped actually consents to sexual contact, it is 
absolutely unnecessary to take away someone's rights in their entirety. A test to ensure 
that consent was actually given is one thing, but to take a class of individuals and 
dictate that those individuals cannot consent no matter what simply goes too far. This 
Court should find that I.C. § 18-1505B is unconstitutionally overbroad. 
4. Mr. Knutsen Asserts That The Law As Applied To Him Is Unconstitutional 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a substantive due process 
right to engage in private, consensual sexual conduct. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
578 (2003). Mr. Knutsen asserts that because his right to privacy and his right to 
intimate association to have consensual sexual contact has been violated, the statute 
should be held unconstitutional as applied to him. 
To prove a statute is unconstitutional 'as applied,' the party challenging 
the constitutionality of the statute must demonstrate that the statute, as 
applied to the defendant's conduct, is unconstitutional." State v. Cook, 146 
Idaho 261, 262, 192 P.3d 1085, 1086 (Ct.App.2008) (citing Korsen, 138 
Idaho at 712, 69 P.3d at 132). "If a statute as applied to a particular 
defendant infringes upon his or her freedom of speech protected by the 
First Amendment, the defendant's conviction must be reversed without 
any showing that such infringement was 'substantial.' State v. Poe, 139 
Idaho 885, 893, 88 P.3d 704, 712 (2004) (citing Cohen v. California, 403 
U.S. 15, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971)). 
State v. Manzanares, 152 Idaho 410, 426-27 (2012). 
In this case, the jury did not find V.M. lacked consent to engage in sexual 
contact. V.M. testified that Mr. Knutsen asked her if he could touch her breasts and she 
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told him he could. (Tr., p.427, Ls.17-21.) During their conversations, Mr. Knutsen 
touched V.M.'s vagina with his foot. (Tr., p.430, Ls.13-20.) Again according to V.M., 
Mr. Knutsen asked if he could see V.M.'s vagina and she told him he could. (Tr., p.430, 
Ls.13-15.) The two went behind a pop machine so that the staff would not see them. 
(Tr., p.430, Ls.16-19.) When Mr. Knutsen asked V.M. to pull down her pants, she did, 
and showed him her vagina. (Tr., p.434, Ls.14-18.) V.M. also touched Mr. Knutsen's 
penis. (Tr., p.447, Ls.14-17.) Nowhere in V.M.'s testimony does she indicate that 
anything occurred other than consensual contact. 
Moreover, the State's expert, Doctor Hoglund, a doctor in clinical psychology 
testified that given V.M.'s intellectual capacity, if she was educated about sexual 
interaction, she had the cognitive ability to understand. (Tr., p.554, Ls.9-12.) The 
doctor thought with her mental health issues, V.M. would be capable of making 
decisions regarding her welfare. (Tr., p.552, Ls.17-21.) Even though V.M.'s overall IQ 
was low, she is not classified as mentally retarded. (Tr., p.399, Ls.7-11.) The 
evaluating doctor did not see any "vegetative depression" signs, difficulty with anxiety, 
or anything indicating she was willing to give up easily. (Tr., p.539, Ls.13-20.) The 
prosecutor never argued that V.M. did not know what sexual contact was or that she 
failed to understand the consequences of her actions. 
The trial reveals that two adults while admitted into the mental health hospital 
engaged in consensual sexual contact. Because the two were consenting adults, the 
statute, as applied, to the defendant's conduct, is unconstitutional. See Lawrence 539 
U.S. at 578-79; Cook, 146 Idaho at 262; Holden 126 Idaho at 761. 
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111. 
The Application Of Idaho's Sexual Contact With A Vulnerable Adult Statute To Private 1 
Consensual Sexual Relations Between Consenting Adults Violates Mr. Knutsen's Right 
To Due Process Of Law And Equal Protection 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Knutsen asserts that Idaho's sexual contact with a vulnerable adult statute 
(I.C. § 18-15058) is unconstitutional for violating substantive due process and equal 
protection. The application of that statute to private, consensual sexual relations 
violates the right of privacy recognized by the United States Supreme Court. The 
statute makes no distinction between consensual and nonconsensual acts and, 
therefore, the statute encompasses consensual conduct and is overbroad in its sweep, 
impermissibly intruding upon a constitutionally protected privacy interest. 
B. Standard Of Review And Standing 
A party challenging the constitutionality of a statute must overcome a strong 
presumption of validity. Cobb, 132 Idaho at 97. However, the constitutionality of a 
statute is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Hart, 135 Idaho at 829. 
Mr. Knutsen is asserting his own rights to engage in sexual contact with a consenting 
adult. See State v. Holden, 126 Idaho 755 (1995); Anderson v. Morrow, 371 F.3d 1027, 
1040 (9th Cir. 2004) (8erzon, CJ. Concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
C. Idaho Code § 18-15058 Is Unconstitutional Because It Violates Substantive Due 
Process 
"The Due Process Clause provides heightened protection against government 
interference with fundamental rights and liberties." State v. Doe, 148 Idaho 919, 933-34 
(2010) (citing Washington v. G/ucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)). As explained in 
Issue II and incorporated fully herein, the right to privacy is a fundamental right 
recognized by the United States Supreme Court and Idaho appellate courts. "[A] 
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government practice or statute which restricts 'fundamental rights' ... is to be subjected 
to 'strict scrutiny' and can be justified only if it furthers a compelling government purpose 
and, even then, only if no less restrictive alternative is available." Id. at 935 (quoting 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357, (1979). 
In an attempt to justify the law, the State argued that the obvious purpose of 
protecting physically and mentally impaired citizens from nonconsensual sex was a 
sufficient legitimate interest and is consistent with Idaho's disfavor for consensual 
unmarried sexual contact, as evidenced by the laws prohibiting unmarried individuals 
from having sex (I. C. § 18-6603) and prohibiting consensual sexual relationships 
between a married individual and another person (I.C. § 18-6601). (R., pp.130-131.) 
The State concluded that the statute's legitimate state interest did not infringe on any 
protected interest of another or violate substantive due process. 
The State does have a legitimate purpose in protecting all citizens from 
nonconsensual sex. However, the law that was passed simply does not meet the 
State's legitimate purpose because it just defines an entire group of people as incapable 
of consenting to sexual contact. While it also may be true that Idaho disfavors 
consensual sex between unmarried individuals, including those having affairs, those 
laws may also be unconstitutional, if challenged, in light of Lawrence. Had Idaho 
attempted to put some limiting construction on the law or narrow it to meet its stated 
purpose of ensuring consent, then Mr. Knutsen would have less of a claim. For 
example, some states limit the law to individuals in authority over a vulnerable adult 
wherein the authoritarian is placed in a position of trust and control and could utilize that 
trust and control over the vulnerable adult. Other states have simply applied their 
consent standard for rape with unsound mind to this situation. Idaho did not provide 
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any limitation, and instead decided that all vulnerable people should not have sexual 
contact. Under strict scrutiny, the State will be unable to justify the law because less 
restrictive alternatives are available. Doe, 148 Idaho at 935. Therefore, this Court 
should find the law unconstitutional on substantive due process grounds. 
D. Idaho Code § 18-1505B Is Unconstitutional Because It Violates Mr. Knutsen's 
Right To Equal Protection 
Mr. Knutsen asserts that I.C. § 18-1505B violates the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In applying that clause, this Court has consistently recognized that the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not deny to State the power to treat different 
classes of persons in different ways. The Equal Protection Clause of that 
amendment does, however, deny to State the power to legislate that 
different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into 
different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of 
that statute. A classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must 
rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation 
to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced 
shall be treated alike.' 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446-47 (1972) (citations omitted). This Court has 
recognized that different levels of scrutiny apply to different types of classifications. 
State v. Joslin, 145 Idaho 75, 83 (2007). Like the substantive due process analysis, 
classification based upon a fundamental right require the most strict scrutiny. Id. At a 
minimum, laws must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental basis. Id. 
In Eisenstadt, the United States Supreme Court struck down a law that prohibited 
the use of contraceptives by unmarried people. Id. at 454-55. The court noted that 
"whatever the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the rights 
must be the same for the unmarried and the married alike." Id. at 453. The Court held 
that "by providing dissimilar treatment for married and unmarried persons who are 
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similarly situated, [the Massachusetts Laws] violate the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 
453-54. 
Idaho Code § 18-15058 suffers the same unfair treatment between married and 
unmarried people. While the language exempting married couples from the statute did 
not make it into the statute, it clear that consenting adults who are married were 
presumed to be exempted from the law. See http://legislatureidaho.gov/ 
sessioninfo/2005/standingcommittees/sjudmin.pdf. Moreover, the State has attempted 
to justify the married person paradox to justify this law. (R., pp.130-131.) 
Even assuming the lowest standard applies in an Equal Protection challenge, 
Mr. Knutsen asserts that the law passed fails to have a rational basis for its stated 
purpose of ensuring consent. The law passed takes away all right to consent and 
declares certain classes of individuals incapable of consenting. The law passed does 
not ensure that a person with limitations provides intelligent consent. Therefore, the law 
fails to have a rational basis for the State's stated purpose, and this Court should find 
the law unconstitutional on Equal Protection grounds. 
IV. 
Idaho's Sexual Abuse Of A Vulnerable Adult Statute Is Unconstitutionally Void For 
Vagueness In Violation Of The Fourteenth Amendment Of The United States 
Constitution 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Knutsen contends that the statue under which he was prosecuted is 
unconstitutionally vague because it fails both to provide fair notice of the prohibited 
conduct and fails to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
A party challenging the constitutionality of a statute must overcome a strong 
presumption of validity. Cobb, 132 Idaho at 197. However, the constitutionality of a 
statute is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Hart, 135 Idaho at 829. 
C. Because This Void For Vagueness Challenge Is Brought Pursuant To The Due 
Process Clause Of The Fourteenth Amendment Of The United States 
Constitution, Idaho Code Section 18-15058 May Be Invalidated On Its Face 
Even When It Could Conceivably Have Had Some Valid Application 
The void for vagueness doctrine is rooted in the Due Process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 457 (2001). This 
"doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient 
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a 
manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Ko/ender v. 
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (citation omitted). "The more important aspect of the 
vagueness doctrine 'is not actual notice, but the other principle element of the doctrine -
the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law 
enforcement."' Id. at 358 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974)). "Where 
the legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit a 
'standardless sweep that allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their 
personal predilections."' Id. (quoting, Smith, 415 U.S. at 575). "Legislatures may not 
so abdicate their responsibilities for setting the standards of the criminal law." Smith v. 
Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974). Rather, the "absence of any ascertainable standard 
for inclusion or exclusion is precisely what offends the Due Process Clause." Id. at 578 
(citation omitted). Simply put, a law is void for vagueness when it subjects a person "to 
criminal liability under a standard so indefinite that police, court, and jury [are] free to 
react to nothing more than their own preferences .... " Id. 
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1. In The Context Of Criminal Laws, A Fourteenth Amendment, Facial-
Vagueness Challenge Does Not Require A Showing That The Law Is 
Unconstitutionally Vague In All Its Applications 
As a preliminary matter, Mr. Knutsen asks this Court to apply the standard of 
review for facial vagueness challenges in the context of criminal laws as adopted by the 
United States Supreme Court. Specifically, Mr. Knutsen asks this Court to recognize 
that, in light of U.S. Supreme Court precedent that so holds, and despite Idaho 
Supreme Court precedent to the contrary, in the context of criminal laws a Fourteenth 
Amendment, facial-vagueness challenge does not require a showing that the law is 
unconstitutionally vague in all its applications. 
Generally, the doctrine of stare decisis requires a court to follow controlling 
precedent unless there is a compelling reason to depart from such precedent. See, 
e.g., State v. Reyes, 131 Idaho 239, 240 (1998). Such reasons include where the 
controlling precedent is manifestly wrong; where it has proven over time to be unwise or 
unjust; or where overruling the precedent is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious 
principles of law and remedy continued injustice. Id. Prior precedent from the Idaho 
Supreme Court concludes that, in order for a facial vagueness challenge to a criminal 
law to be successful, the complainant must demonstrate that the law is impermissibly 
vague in all of its applications. State v. Doe, 148 Idaho 919, 924-925, 931 (201 O); 
State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 712 (2003); State v. Hellickson, 135 Idaho 742, 745 
(2001); State v. Prather, 135 Idaho 770, 773 (2001); State v. Leferink, 133 Idaho 780, 
784 (1999); State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 199 (1998); State v. Bitt, 118 Idaho 584, 587 
(1990). These decisions have universally relied upon the United States Supreme Court 
decision in Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489 (1982), as the source of 
this rule. Doe 148 Idaho at 925; Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712; Leferink, 133 Idaho at 784; 
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Cobb, 132 Idaho at 199; Bitt, 118 Idaho at 587.5 However, reliance upon the specific 
standard from Village of Hoffman Estates is misplaced as it has been expressly stated 
by the United States Supreme Court to be an improper standard in the context of a 
Fourteenth Amendment, facial-vagueness challenge to a criminal law. Ko/ender, 461 
U.S. at 358; see also City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 (1999) (plurality 
opinion). 
The United States Supreme Court in Village of Hoffman Estates was called upon 
to address the issue of whether a local civil ordinance requiring businesses to obtain a 
license in order to sell certain classes of products was unconstitutionally vague on its 
face. Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 491-492. In the context of this regulatory 
statute, the Court held that, "a 'facial' challenge, in this context, means a claim that the 
law is 'invalid in toto - and therefore incapable of any valid application."' Id. at 495, n.5 
(quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 474 (1974)). The Court in Village of 
Hoffman Estates proceeded to clarify that this rule was a "less strict vagueness test" 
than would normally be applied because the ordinance was an economic regulation and 
that the "degree of vagueness that the Constitution tolerates" depends upon the nature 
of the enactment. Id. at 498. 
The United States Supreme Court has subsequently specifically articulated that 
the standard from Village of Hoffman Estates that required a showing that the statute 
was vague in all of its applications is not the correct standard when the law at issue 
imposes criminal penalties. Ko/ender, 461 U.S. at 358, n.8. In Ko/ender, the Court 
articulated several reasons why this standard was inapplicable where the law being 
5 While Hellickson and Prather cite to Cobb as the legal authority in support of this 
standard, the Court in Cobb cites to Village of Hoffman Estates as the legal authority for 
this rule. Hellickson, 135 Idaho at 7 46; Prather, 135 Idaho at 773. 
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challenged is a criminal law. Importantly, the Court placed heavy emphasis on the fact 
that, where a law imposes criminal penalties, "the standard of certainty is higher." Id. In 
other words, the Court will require more definiteness to the language of criminal laws in 
order to pass constitutional muster, and will correspondingly impose greater scrutiny 
that a criminal law is unconstitutionally void for vagueness. As the Court noted, "this 
concern has, at times, led us to invalidate a criminal statute on its face even when it 
could conceivably have had some valid application." Id. The Court in Ko/ender also 
went on to note that the standard articulated in Village of Hoffman Estates was a "less 
strict vagueness standard" applied because, "the ordinance in Hoffman Estates 'simply 
regulates business behavior,' and that 'economic regulation is subject to a less strict 
vagueness test because its subject matter is often more narrow."' Id. (quoting Village of 
Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499). 
There can be little doubt that Ko/ender, and its explicit limitation of Village of 
Hoffman Estates, is still "good law." In the more recent case of City of Chicago v. 
Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999), where the Supreme Court struck down a gang loitering 
ordinance as being impermissibly vague on its face (because it failed to meaningfully 
define the term "loiter"), the Court declined to apply the Village of Hoffman Estates 
standard because the ordinance at issue was not a business regulation, did not contain 
a scienter requirement, and was a criminal law that infringed upon constitutionally 
protected rights.6 Morales, 527 U.S. at 55. 
In Korsen, the Idaho Supreme Court relied upon United States v. Salerno, 481 
U.S. 739, 745 (1987). However, just as in Hoffman Estates, in Salerno the United 
6 Again, then-Chief Justice Rehnquist joined a dissent-this time, Justice Thomas' 
dissent-wherein it was contended that the Village of Hoffman Estates standard ought 
to control. Morales, 527 U.S. at 114 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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States Supreme Court addressed a regulatory statute, not a statute which imposes 
criminal punishment. In discussing the statute, the Salemo Court stated, 
Respondents first argue that the Act violates substantive due process 
because the pretrial detention it authorizes constitutes impermissible 
punishment before trial. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, and n. 16, 
99 S.Ct. 1861, 1872, and n. 16, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). The Government, 
however, has never argued that pretrial detention could be upheld if it 
were "punishment." The Court of Appeals assumed that pretrial detention 
under the Bail Reform Act is regulatory, not penal, and we agree that it is. 
Salemo, 481 U.S. at 746. Thus, application of the standards articulated in Salemo is 
inappropriate when the statute at issue authorizes criminal penalties, i.e., punishment. 
As shown above, prior Idaho precedent requiring a showing that a criminal law is 
impermissibly vague in all its applications is directly contrary to the express holding of 
the United States Supreme Court in Kolendar, which articulates the proper standard for 
a Fourteenth Amendment based facial-vagueness challenge to a law which imposes 
criminal penalties. As such, the line of Idaho cases which apply the "less strict 
vagueness standard" from cases addressing regulatory statutes to claims to federal 
constitutional claims addressing criminal statutes, is manifestly wrong and was 
expressly rejected by the United States Supreme Court as such. Rather, because 
Mr. Knutsen brings his claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the statute at issue imposes criminal 
penalties, the proper analysis to be applied is that articulated by the United States 
Supreme Court in Ko/ender, 461 U.S. at 358, which allows a law which imposes a 
criminal penalty to be invalidated on its face even when it could conceivably have had 
some valid application. 
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2. Even Assuming This Court Fails To Follow Ko/ender, A More Stringent 
Vagueness Standard Should Apply In This Case Because It Impacts 
Constitutionally Protected Rights 
In 2010, in State v. Doe, involving a juvenile curfew ordinance, this Court 
identified the facial void for vagueness test that Idaho utilizes. State v. Doe, 148 Idaho 
919 (2010). The Doe Court first recognized that according to Village of Hoffman 
Estates, supra, in evaluating a facial vagueness challenge, it must first decide whether 
the law "reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct." Id. at 925 
(citation omitted). Twice the Court indicated that the ordinance must be shown to be 
impermissibly vague in all of its applications again citing to Village of Hoffman Estates, 
supra. Id. at 925, 931. Nevertheless, the Court recognized that a more stringent test 
may be applicable under certain circumstances, such as free speech and the right to 
association. Id. at 931. Therefore, a more stringent vagueness test is applicable when 
the challenged law is not regulating business activity or economic regulations and 
"regulates constitutionally protected conduct or a significant amount of that conduct". 
State v. Larsen, 135 Idaho 754, 756 (2001 ). 
3. Under Either Standard, The Sexual Abuse Of A Vulnerable Adult Statute 
Is Vague On Its Face 
The district court found that the statute was not unconstitutionally facially vague. 
(R., pp.188-190.) The court held that "[t]he plain meaning of the statute provides fair 
notice to citizens regarding the potential criminal responsibility for having sexual contact 
with a vulnerable adult." (R., p.190.) The district court erred. 
Applying the standard to the facts of this case, the sexual abuse of a vulnerable 
adult statute is unconstitutionally vague. The criminal statute in this case targets 
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constitutionally protected conduct7 without a scienter requirement. The statute fails to 
define who is a vulnerable adult with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can 
understand what conduct is prohibited. It authorizes and encourages arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement. 
The statutory scheme under which Mr. Knutsen was convicted provides: 
It is a felony for any person, with the intent of arousing, appealing to or 
gratifying the lust, passion or sexual desires of such person, a vulnerable 
adult or a third party, to: ... [c]ause or have sexual contact with a 
vulnerable adult, not amounting to lewd conduct as defined in paragraph 
(a) of this subsection. 
Idaho Code § 18-1505B. Idaho Code § 18-1505 defines vulnerable adult as 
a person eighteen ( 18) years of age or older who is unable to protect 
himself from abuse, neglect or exploitation due to physical or mental 
impairment which affects the person's judgment or behavior to the extent 
that he lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate 
or implement decisions regarding his person, funds, property or resources. 
Mr. Knutsen asserts that it is not possible for a reasonable person to read the definition 
of vulnerable adult and understand when a person is unable to engage in 
constitutionally protected behavior; it invokes different standards in different people and 
is too indefinite to serve as a basis for a criminal charge. The average person of 
reasonable intelligence would not be able to tell when they are committing a crime and 
would allow for police officers, courts, and juries to make arbitrary determinations. 
The statute allows for anyone at any given time in their life to become a 
vulnerable adult due to normal life circumstances. Without some insight, most of us 
would not know if another person is suffering from a physical or mental impairment that 
affects one's judgment or behavior that may affect one's decision-making ability. This 
7 Mr. Knutsen has discussed the constitutionally protected rights in previous issues and 
incorporates the previous arguments herein. 
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interpretation of the statute was exactly what the prosecutor argued to the district court 
for the meaning of vulnerable adult. The State argued, if sexual contact occurs between 
two people and one of those individuals "has a physical or mental impairment which 
affects judgment and understanding, the other person had better not have sexual 
contact with him or her." (R., p.126.) The State also suggested, '"mental impairment' 
obviously refer[red] to a mental disability which makes the person unable to understand 
like an average person."8 (R., p.126.) Certainly leaving it to the police, prosecutors, 
and jurors to determine who is average and whose intelligence would result in wise 
decision making would result in each entity applying their own moral code to the 
determination and arbitrary results. 
Take for example a single mom who suffers from mild depression and decides to 
go out on the town one evening. She consumes a few drinks and meets a good looking 
college student who just so happens to have been placed on academic probation, a few 
days prior. Neither is thinking clearly; their judgments are impaired due to their mental 
status. They make some poor decisions have sexual contact. The mom of the college 
boy is outraged. She calls and wants the mom arrested for taking advantage of her 
son's mental state and low intelligence. Who should the government prosecute - the 
single mom, who has a 72 IQ, or the college student who has a 75 IQ? Both are adults, 
both knew the nature of the sexual contact, both knew the consequences of engaging in 
sexual contact, and both consented to the act. The answer is neither. Neither 
8 The State attempted to analogize the vulnerable adult statute to the rape statute 
wherein consent can be negated by demonstrating that the person was of unsound 
mind. In other words, that the person participating in sex did not know what the act was 
or the consequences thereof. Mr. Knutsen would welcome such interpretation in this 
arena. Wherein a person who may be vulnerable would still have the capability of 
consenting to sex. 
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individual was on notice that the law prohibited them from having sexual contact with 
the other. 
Take another example: a twenty-year-old ski jumper breaks his leg performing 
one of his Olympic tryout tricks which results in him being partially paralyzed and quite 
depressed from his prognosis. He and his high school sweetheart continue their 
relationship and have sexual relations. They are both adults; know the nature of their 
sexual contact, and the consequences thereof. However, a jealous ex-girlfriend decides 
to call the police because she does not believe the ski jumper is in his right mind and 
would not continue the relationship with his high school sweetheart; she believes by 
definition he is a vulnerable adult. Again, it would be up to the discretion of the 
prosecutor to file charges and a jury to convict based upon their own moral code. 
How about the women that finds herself filing for divorce. The women's financial 
stability is called into question and she is eventually forced into filing for bankruptcy. 
The bankruptcy court determines how her paycheck will be spent to pay off her creditors 
and she is forbidden from incurring any further debt. She is emotionally unstable due to 
the divorce proceedings, having to move out of her home, and start a new career. She 
is mentally impaired and the impairment affects her behavior and judgment. She 
continues to make bad choices. Her new boyfriend is not privy to her divorce, 
bankruptcy, or other emotional instabilities. The two have consensual intercourse. 
Again, the discretion of the prosecutor, police, and juries will determine whether or not 
the boyfriend's conduct is criminal in that he had intercourse with a vulnerable adult. 
Finally, what about the two mentally disabled adults that have been girlfriend and 
boyfriends for 10 years are they prohibited from having sexual intercourse. They both 
have 10s in the mid 60 range. They know the nature of sexual intercourse and the 
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consequences thereof. Are they violating the law? It is completely arbitrary whom the 
prosecutor will charge or the jury will convict. 
This law encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. As written, it 
allows the police, prosecutors, and juries to arrest and convict based upon their own 
sexual morals. It allows for each person in the process to determine by their own 
sexual moral guidelines if a person with a physical or mental disability should be having 
sexual contact. Those with strict guidelines would find nearly almost all conduct 
immoral and thus criminal. Those with more individualized morals would look on each 
case on an ad hoc basis giving very little guidance to the citizens of Idaho of when one 
is breaking the law. 
Had the legislature imposed a scinter requirement like other jurisdictions, or only 
made it illegal when one stands in a fiduciary capacity, or simply made it similar to the 
rape statute on whether the person consented, the law could have been saved. 
However, because the legislature utilized a very general definition for vulnerability that 
encourages arbitrary enforcement, it should be held unconstitutional for facial 
vagueness. 
D. The Statute, As Applied To Mr. Knutsen's Conduct, Is Unconstitutionally Vague 
In Violation Of The Due Process Clause Of The Fourteenth Amendment To The 
U.S. Constitution 
A statute may also be challenged as unconstitutionally vague as applied to the 
defendant's specific conduct. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712. To succeed in making an as 
applied challenge, a defendant "must show that he did not receive fair notice from the 
statute and interpretive case law that his particular conduct was punishable." State v. 
Wees, 138 Idaho 119,123 (2002) (citing Parkerv. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 755-57 (1974)). 
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There is no succinct definition of who is a vulnerable adult. This is not like the 
strict liability laws that apply in statutory rape cases where a person is definitively under 
age or not. The determination of who is a vulnerable adult as defined imposes a 
subjective test which changes from person to person. Unlike the forcible rape statute, 
the law does not turn on whether proper consent was given. Consent is irrelevant to the 
determination of guilt in the vulnerable adult statute framework. Thus, a person with no 
knowledge of a person's vulnerable status will still be held criminally liable for having 
sexual contact with that person, regardless of whether the participant had a reasonable 
belief that the person was consenting to the activity the two were involved in. The law 
fails to give fair notice of when a crime is being committed. 
In this case, the State argued many things that contributed to V.M.'s vulnerability. 
None of it relating to whether, because of her vulnerability, she was able to consent to 
sexual contact because she lacked the understanding about sexual contact and knew 
the consequences thereof. The State's expert, Doctor Hoglund, a doctor in clinical 
psychology testified, that given V.M.'s intellectual capacity, if she was educated about 
sexual interaction, she had the cognitive ability to understand. (Tr., p.554, Ls.9-12.) 
Moreover, the doctor thought with her mental health issues, she would be capable of 
making decisions regarding her welfare. (Tr., p.552, Ls.17-21.) There was a lack of 
evidence involving whether V.M. had been educated on sexual interactions. (See 
generally Tr.) 
The prosecutor sought a conviction in part because of V.M.'s low IQ. However, 
V.M. is not mentally retarded;9 she has borderline intelligence. (Tr., p. 399, Ls.7-11, 
9 Even assuming that V.M.'s IQ fell below 70, she still should have the ability to consent 
to sexual intercourse as a fundamental right. Simply because her IQ is low does not 
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p.533, Ls.1-2.) Even though her overall IQ was low, her verbal IQ was higher, ranging 
in the 80s, demonstrating a greater ability to understand sexual contact and its 
consequences. (Tr., p.535, Ls.22-25.) The State also suggested, "'mental impairment' 
obviously refer[red] to a mental disability which makes the person unable to understand 
like an average person." (R., p.126.) Anyone below "average" in the eyes of the 
prosecutor would be "vulnerable." It should be noted that V.M. appeared to have 
testified properly, answering questions asked by the prosecutor and defense counsel 
without much confusion or leading from either party. ( See generally Tr.) 
The prosecutor argued that V.M.'s depression made her "vulnerable." 
(Tr., p.671, Ls.23-25.) V.M. reported she was feeling depressed. (Tr., p.466, Ls.23-24, 
p.467, Ls.16-17.) However, the evaluating doctor did not see any "vegetative 
depression" signs, difficulty with anxiety, or anything indicating she was willing to give 
up easily. (Tr., p.539, Ls.13-20.) The doctor did indicate that depending on the severity 
of the depression, decision making could be difficult. (Tr., p.541, Ls.5-7.) No Idaho 
citizen would presume to understand that the law would preclude a person from 
consenting to sexual contact because of depression. 
The prosecutor argued that V.M. became "more vulnerable" because she had a 
broken ankle and utilized a walker to move around. (Tr., p.664, Ls.13-16 (The 
prosecutor arguing at closing, "She had ... ankle that had been broken, and she had it 
in a cast. She was using a walker. That certainly increases her vulnerability at the time 
of the event.'')) No Idaho citizen would presume to understand that the law would 
preclude a person from consenting to sex because of a broken ankle. 
render her incapable of understanding sexual intercourse and the consequences 
thereof. 
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The prosecutor also argued that because V.M. was unable to handle her 
finances she was vulnerable. (Tr., p.664, L.23-p.665, L.25.) At trial, V.M. explained that 
her mother was her guardian and paid her bills so that her money is handled properly. 
(Tr., p.404, Ls.24-25.) No Idaho citizen would presume to understand that a person 
who has financial problems, needing assistance to pay the proper bills, would not be 
able to engage in sexual contact under the law. 
As applied in this case, the statute is vague. The prosecutor's argument 
demonstrates why Idaho citizens are not on notice of when they are violating the law. 
The prosecutor never argued that V.M. did not know what sexual contact was or that 
she failed to understand the consequences of her actions. What the prosecutor argued 
were things that Mr. Knutsen would not have necessarily known from his contact with 
V.M. In general, both Mr. Knutsen and V.M. were in the hospital for mental impairment 
reasons. Neither was thinking at their best. Both of their judgments were impaired. 
The prosecutor picked one vulnerable person over the other, demonstrating why this 
statute authorizes arbitrary enforcement and convictions. 
Allowing Mr. Knutsen's conviction to stand when the statute (which lacks any 
case law interpreting the issues he raises), as applied to his conduct, is so vague that it 
failed to provide him with "fair notice," and authorized arbitrary enforcement and 
convictions as to whether his conduct was criminal, violates his rights under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
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V. 
The District Court Erred When It Instructed The Jury That V.M.'S Consent To Sexual 
Contact Was Not A Defense To The Crime Of Sexual Abuse Of A Vulnerable Adult 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Knutsen asserts that the district court should not have provided the consent 
defense instruction, or alternatively should have utilized the consent instruction 
applicable to rape involving a person of unsound mind. Because the jury was 
wrongfully instructed, the matter should be remanded for a new jury trial with proper 
instructions. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The appellate courts exercise free review when considering the propriety of jury 
instructions. State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370, 372 (2002); State v. Row, 131 Idaho 303, 
310 (1998). After rejecting proposed instructions on the defendant's theory of the case, 
the court has a heightened obligation to properly instruct the jury. State v. Eastman, 
122 Idaho 87, 90-91 (1992). When reviewing jury instructions, an appellate court must 
first ask whether the instructions as a whole fairly and accurately reflect the applicable 
law. Row, 131 Idaho at 310 (citing State v. Enno, 119 Idaho 392,405 (1991); State v. 
Bowman, 124 Idaho 936, 942 (Ct. App. 1993)). Specifically, an appellate court's 
"review focuses upon whether the instruction that was given to the jury misstated the 
law or was so confusing and argumentative as to mislead the jury." Id. (citing State v. 
Rhoades, 121 Idaho 63, 82, (1991)). Reversible error occurs when an instruction 
misleads the jury or prejudices a party. Young, 138 Idaho at 372. 
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C. Improper Jury Instructions Violate The Constitutional Guarantees Of Both Due 
Process And The Right To A Trial By Jury 
Mr. Knutsen lodged an ongoing objection to the court's analysis of the vulnerable 
adult statute, including the proposed instruction regarding consent not being a defense 
to the charge. (Tr., p.636, Ls.6-20.) Mr. Knutsen contends that the district court's 
failure to instruct on consent improperly interpreted the case law and denied 
Mr. Knutsen the guarantees of due process and the right to a trial by jury. 
The requirement that a jury find the defendant guilty of every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime charge, beyond a reasonable doubt, stems from the 
interrelationship between the Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, and the jury trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment. See In re Winship 
397 U.S. 358 (1970); Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 
508 U.S. 275 (1993). The Idaho Constitution protects these basic liberties through 
Article I, section 13. Idaho Const. Art 1, § 13. Among other rights and protections, 
every criminal defendant is presumed to be innocent; that presumption cannot be 
overcome except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime alleged; and, a defendant has the right to a jury determination of 
whether the State has proven the necessary facts beyond a reasonable doubt. See 
U.S. CONST. amds V, VI, XIV; see also In re Winship, generally, see Taylor, generally, 
see Sullivan, generally. These concepts are the bedrock principles of the fundamental 
right to a fair trial. Id. Where a jury is not instructed that they must find, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the existence of a fact necessary to support a conviction, the 
defendant has been denied due process of law and his Sixth Amendment jury trial 
guarantee. See Pope v. //linois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987); Neder v. U.S., 527 U.S. 1, 12 
(1999); see also Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433,437 (2004). 
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Admittedly, ordinarily the language employed by the legislature in defining a 
crime is deemed to be best suited for that purpose, and error cannot be predicated on 
its use in jury instructions. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 264 ( 1996) ( citing State v. 
Aragon, 107 Idaho 358, 362 (1984); State v. Herr, 97 Idaho 783, 787-88 (1976)). This 
general rule is correctly applied to "terms which are of common usage and are 
sufficiently generally understood .... " Id. (citing State v. Gonzales, 92 Idaho 152, 156, 
(1968)). However, this general rule is "not inconsistent with the principle that where the 
statutory language contains a specific legal meaning not commonly understood, the jury 
must be instructed accordingly." State v. Olin, 111 Idaho 516, (1986) (citing State v. 
Timmons, 12 Wash.App. 48, 527 P.2d 1399, 1403-04 (1974) (legal definition of 
obscenity must be provided to jury)). 
The district court instructed the jury on who was a vulnerable adult. (R., p.38.) It 
utilized the statutory language found at I.C. § 18-1505. (R., p.38.) Although the 
definition itself is plagued with problems as discussed throughout this brief, the issue 
that Mr. Knutsen has is with the consent instruction the court provided. He submits that 
it is not the law. The court instructed the jury that "it is not a defense to the crime of 
Sexual Abuse of a Vulnerable Adult that V.M. may have consented to the alleged 
conduct." (R., p.393.) 
Idaho has recognized that the only time that consent of victim is no defense is 
when the charge involves a child under age. See State v. Herr, 97 Idaho 783,787 
(1976); State v. Oar, 129 Idaho 337, 340 (1996). Had the district court not instructed on 
the consent defense, there would have been more room to argue the meaning of 
vulnerable adult as it relates to the charges, and whether or not V.M. had the capacity to 
protect herself from abuse. 
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Idaho has had resolution of the lack of consent involving the mentally unsound 
for a very long time. In the context of rape and mental unsoundness, this Court noted 
that the jury must determine three prime facts. State v. Cosier, 39 Idaho 519, _ 228 
P. 277, 279 (1924). First, whether sexual intercourse occurred; second, who committed 
the act; and finally, whether the victim was incapable through unsound mind of giving 
legal consent. Id. "For a person to be capable of giving legal consent to act of sexual 
intercourse such person must of necessity have some knowledge of the results that 
naturally flow from such acts; and that the unlawful act offends against the moral law 
and results more or less in social ostracism." Id. at _, 228 P. at 281. Thus, in the 
context of rape, understanding the nature of the act and the consequences of the act 
will render one's willing participation in the act to be consensual. See id. 
In Soura, 10 the issue on appeal was whether in light of the victim's mental 
disabilities, she was still capable of giving legal consent to engage in sexual intercourse 
with the defendant. Soura, 118 Idaho at 233. During police interrogations, Soura 
admitted that the victim was '"very slow' and 'not very competent"'. Id. at 234. 
According to Soura, the victim would do as she was commanded to do, including getting 
herself undressed, getting into bed, and having sex with him, even when the victim was 
a bit hesitant. Id. at 234. By the defendant's own admission during the interrogation, 
the victim could not communicate or implement decisions to protect herself. Id. In 
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the court noted a number of things but most 
strikingly was the victim's lack of understanding of the "potential physical consequences 
10 The Court decided Soura before Lawrence v. Texas and although it recognized a 
person's constitutional right to consent to marriage and procreate, it did not evaluate the 
right to have sexual relations outside the confines of marriage. The Court felt the rape 
law protecting against non-marital sexual relations a legitimate state interest. 
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of sexual intercourse, e.g., pregnancy, syphilis, gonorrhea and herpes," even though 
she gave birth to a child. Id. at 237. Additionally, this Court noted the district court's 
comments about the victim's trial appearance in that the victim's answers were "slow 
and short" and her facial expressions consisted of a "sagging jaw, mouth open ... she 
appeared to stare off into space at times." Id. at 238 (ellipses in the original). 
In a charge of rape involving a mentally unsound person, the district court defines 
what it means for a person to be mentally unsound. See ICJI 908, located at 
http://www.isc.idaho.gov/jury/criminal/900/900Sex0ffenses-All.pdf. Then, the court 
defines how a person of unsound mind may consent to sexual intercourse recognizing 
that if a person does not understand the nature or consequences of the act, the person 
of unsound mind is incapable of giving legal consent. See ICJI 907, located at 
http://www.isc.idaho.gov/jury/criminal/900/900Sex0ffenses-All.pdf. The district court 
should have followed suit in this case by first defining what is meant by being a 
vulnerable person and then providing the instruction of legal consent contained at ICJI 
907. 
The instructions given misstated the law or alternatively was so confusing it 
mislead the jury. The error here prejudiced Mr. Knutsen because he was unable to 
argue that V.M. had the ability to protect herself from sexual contact because she knew 
what the act and consequences thereof were, and she willingly participated in the 
sexual contact. A new trial should be ordered with proper instructions that would 
require the jury to determine whether V.M. legally consented to the sexual touching. 
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VI. 
This Court Should Vacate Mr. Knutsen's Convictions For Sexual Abuse Of A Vulnerable 
Adult As There Was Insufficient Evidence To Support The Convictions Because The 
State Failed To Prove That V.M. Was A Vulnerable Adult 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Knutsen asserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to 
support the jury's guilty verdicts. The State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove 
V.M. was a vulnerable adult. Therefore, this Court should vacate Mr. Knutsen's 
convictions. 
B. Substantial And Competent Evidence On Each Element Of The Offense Charged 
Is Required To Support A Conviction 
The sufficiency of the evidence presented to sustain a conviction can be raised 
for the first time on appeal. State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873, 877-878 (1995). An 
appellate court's review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is 
limited in scope. State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104 (Ct. App. 2001). The reviewing 
court will not set aside the judgment of conviction following a jury verdict, if "there is 
substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the 
prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential elements of a crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt." State v. Crawford, 130 Idaho 592, 594 (Ct. App. 1997). The 
appellate court applies the same standard when reviewing the trial court's decision to 
grant or deny a motion for a judgment of acquittal. State v. Willard, 129 Idaho 827, 828 
(Ct. App. 1997). 
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court will conduct an 
independent review of the evidence in the record to determine whether a reasonable 
mind could conclude that each material element of the offense was proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Willard, 129 Idaho at 828; Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104. The Court will 
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not substitute its views for that of the jury when determining "the credibility of the 
witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be 
drawn from the evidence." Crawford, 130 Idaho at 595. Furthermore, the Court will 
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Id. "For evidence 
to be substantial, it must be of sufficient quality that reasonable minds could reach the 
same conclusion." State v. Johnson, 131 Idaho 808, 809 (Ct. App. 1998) ( citing Bott v. 
Idaho State Bldg. Auth., 128 Idaho 580, 586 (1996)). 
C. The Evidence Presented At Trial Was Insufficient To Support The Jury's Verdicts 
Finding Mr. Knutsen Guilty Of Sexual Abuse Of A Vulnerable Adult Because The 
State Failed To Prove Beyond A Reasonable Doubt V.M. Was A Vulnerable 
Adult 
Mr. Knutsen was charged with four counts of sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult. 
(R., pp.12-14.) He asserts that the State's evidence was insufficient to support the jury's 
verdicts and that his conviction must be vacated. 
The jury was instructed in order to find Mr. Knutsen guilty of the charged offenses 
it had to find that Mr. Knutsen had sexual contact with V.M. and that V.M. was a 
vulnerable adult. (R., pp.385, 386, 387, 388.) The court defined vulnerable adult as: 
a person eighteen years of age or older who is unable to protect herself 
from abuse, neglect or exploitation due to physical or mental impairment 
which affects the person's judgment or behavior to the extent that she 
lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate or 
implement decisions regarding her person, funds, property or resources. 
This is the identical language from the statute. I.C. § 18-1505.11 In the mental 
impairment application, the statute requires the State to demonstrate that the person is 
unable to protect themself from abuse because their mental impairment causes them to 
11 Mr. Knutsen asserts that the statute is unconstitutional. However, for purposes of his 
argument on the sufficiency claim, he interprets the statute as narrowly as possible. 
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lack understanding or capacity to make, communicate, or implement decisions 
regarding their person. 
In the instant case, the State failed to demonstrate that V.M. was unable to 
protect herself from abuse because of her mental impairment. The State's expert, 
Doctor Hoglund, a doctor in clinical psychology, testified that given V.M.'s intellectual 
capacity, if she was educated about sexual interaction, she had the cognitive ability to 
understand. (Tr., p.554, Ls.9-12.) The doctor thought with her mental health issues, 
she would be capable of making decisions regarding her welfare. (Tr., p.552, Ls.17-21.) 
The evaluating doctor did not see any "vegetative depression" signs, difficulty with 
anxiety, or anything indicating she was willing to give up easily. (Tr., p.539, Ls.13-20.) 
V.M. is not mentally retarded. (Tr., p.399, Ls.7-11.) Her overall IQ is 72 and her 
verbal comprehension index is an 81 with vocabulary being one of her many strengths. 
(Tr., p.532, Ls.20-22, p.535, Ls.24-25, p.537, Ls.19-22.) V.M. successfully graduated 
Minico High School. (Tr., p.403, L.14-p.404, L.1.) She received Bs and Cs in the more 
difficult classes, recognizing that her grades were above average in some of the regular 
course work. (Tr., p.460, Ls.8-13.) 
There was no evidence that V.M. should have been qualified as a vulnerable 
adult because she was unable to protect herself from abuse due to her mental 
impairment. A better determination could have been made if the jurors were given the 
jury instruction regarding consent in the context of an unsound mind in the rape context. 
This Court could then know whether the jurors believed she consented to the sexual 
contact. Nevertheless, even without the jury making the determination with a very strict 
reading of the vulnerable adult statute, the State failed to demonstrate that V.M. was 
unable to protect herself from abuse. 
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The State did argue that V.M.'s broken leg made V.M. more vulnerable. While in 
the general sense that may be true, under the narrowest reading of the vulnerable adult 
statute, having a broken ankle would not render V.M. unable to protect herself from 
abuse. Likewise, having a guardian pay your bills does not render one unable to protect 
oneself from abuse. 
There is no substantial evidence to support the jury's finding that V.M. was 
unable to protect herself from abuse. Therefore, this Court should hold that the State 
failed to meet its burden of proof, and vacate the judgment of conviction. 
VII. 
Mr. Knutsen's Protection Against Double Punishment Under The Double Jeopardy 
Clauses Of The United States And Idaho Constitutions Was Violated Because He Was 
Charged And Convicted Of Four Counts Of Sexual Abuse Of A Vulnerable Adult Where 
His Actions Amounted To One Continuous Act, Without A Break In The Chain Of 
Events, Such That He Should Only Be Punished For One Offense 
A Introduction 
Mr. Knutsen was charged with and convicted of four counts of sexual abuse of a 
vulnerable adult despite the fact that the conduct was one continuance act, without a 
break in the chain of events. Because I.C. § 18-1505B contemplates a continuing act, 
Mr. Knutsen's protection against double punishment under the double jeopardy clauses 
of the United States and Idaho Constitution were violated. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Idaho Appellate Courts have free review over questions of law. State v. Larios, 
125 Idaho 727, 874 P.2d 538 (1994). "Whether a defendant has been placed in 
jeopardy twice is a question of law." State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 33, 951 P.2d 1249, 
1260 (1997) (citing State v. Reichenberg, 128 Idaho 452,454, 915 P.2d 14, 16 (1996)). 
As such, because double jeopardy claims are grounded in the Fifth Amendment to the 
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United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution, they 
present questions of law which are subject to free review. State v. Byington, 139 Idaho 
516, 518, 81 P.3d 421, 423 (Ct. App. 2003). 
C. Mr. Knutsen's Double Jeopardy Claim Is Properly Before This Court 
Mr. Knutsen acknowledges that no objection was made in the district court that 
he should only be punished for one offense. The applicable analysis to unobjected 
fundamental error is set forth in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, (2010), where our 
Supreme Court stated: 
If the alleged error was not followed by a contemporaneous objection, it 
shall only be reviewed by an appellate court under Idaho's fundamental 
error doctrine. Such review includes a three-prong inquiry wherein the 
defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the 
alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived 
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as 
to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not 
harmless. 
Id. at 228. 
Mr. Knutsen asserts that the error violates one or more of his constitutional 
rights, the error plainly exists, and the error is not harmless. The Double Jeopardy 
Clause of the United States Constitution provides that no person shall "be subject for 
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." The Clause affords a 
defendant three basic protections. It protects against a second prosecution for the same 
offense after acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and 
multiple criminal punishments for the same offense. Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 229 
(1994); State v. McKeeth, 136 Idaho 619, 622 (Ct. App. 2001). The only issue in this 
case is the third protection - multiple criminal punishments for the same offense. 
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D. Mr. Knutsen's Protection Against Double Punishment Under The Double 
Jeopardy Clauses Of The United States And Idaho Constitutions Was Violated 
The Idaho Supreme Court has previously addressed whether a course of 
conduct amounts to one offense, or several. See State v. Major, 111 Idaho 410 (1986). 
In Major, the Court held that whether a course of criminal conduct constitutes one or 
several offenses depends on "whether or not the conduct constituted separate, distinct 
and independent crimes." Id. at 414. "This inquiry requires consideration of the 
circumstances of the conduct. Id. Additionally, the Court held that said determination 
requires a look at the circumstances of the conduct and consideration of the "intent and 
objective of the actor." Id. The test employed by Idaho courts is whether the acts are 
a "part of 'single incident or pursuant to a common scheme or plan reflecting a since, 
continuing [criminal] impulse or intent .... " Id. (quoting State v. Lloyd, 103 Idaho 382, 
383 (1982)). In State v. Estes, 111 Idaho 423 (1986), the Court held: "Although four 
acts of sexual penetration occurred, they were part of one continuing transaction. The 
separate penetrations were not separate acts at different times, in different places, with 
different actors or circumstances." Id. at 427. In Estes, the defendant entered the room 
of the victim and forcibly raped her four times. Id. at 424. Accordingly, although there 
were four separate acts of penetration, the Court acknowledged that only one rape 
occurred and the remaining acts were part of a "continuing single incident." Id. at 427. 
Mr. Knutsen was charged with four counts of sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult. 
While the victim did testify to four separate acts of sexual touching, they were all part of 
one continuing transaction. The touching happened in close time and spatial proximity 
to each other. Mr. Knutsen asked V.M. if he could touch her breasts and she told him 
he could. (Tr., p.427, Ls.17-21.) Mr. Knutsen also touched V.M.'s vagina with his foot. 
(Tr., p.430, Ls.13-20.) Mr. Knutsen then asked if he could see V.M.'s vagina and she 
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told him he could. (Tr., p.430, Ls.13-15.) The two went behind a pop machine so that 
the staff would not see them. (Tr., p.430, Ls.16-19.) When Mr. Knutsen asked V.M. to 
pull down her pants, she did, and showed him her vagina. (Tr., p.434, Ls.14-18.) V.M. 
also touched Mr. Knutsen's penis. (Tr., p.447, Ls.14-17.) 
Any criminal activity on the part of Mr. Knutsen represents a continuing scheme 
or plan, which, continued throughout the short 30 minute time period, the course of 
conduct was not broken that evening. Accordingly, Mr. Knutsen's protection against 
double punishment was violated when the court imposed four separate punishments for 
the one criminal course of conduct. Assuming all of his other arguments fail, 
Mr. Knutsen request the judgment be corrected to reflect one conviction of sexual abuse 
of a vulnerable adult and not four convictions. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Knutsen respectfully requests that this Court grant him relief consistent with 
the claims of error he has asserted in this appeal. 
DATED this 4th day of February, 2014. 
DIANi!JM. WALKER 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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